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Liberty and liberties in Europe’s federal republics
Thomas Maissen
Liberty was a core issue for the federal republics in early modern Europe.1
There were not many of them, and even fewer survived as political entities.2
The Confoederatio Bohemica was founded on 31 July 1619 to protect the
estates of Bohemia against the Habsburg monarch who, however, managed
to dissolve them within little more than a year in late 1620.3 To preserve
their liberty, the Bohemians had elected the famousWinter King, Frederick
V, Elector Palatine. That the estates undertook to elect a newmonarch helps
us understand why federal republics and their liberties were particularly
threatened. In timeswhen endemicwarDarwinistically selected those states
that were to survive, a unified army and amilitary leader were indispensable.
Beyond the meaning of personal freedom (sui iuris esse), ‘Liberty’ therefore
could assume the rathernegative implications of being alone anddefenceless,
exposed to the mercy of stronger powers. ‘Liberties’ meant something else:
iuraac libertateswereprivilegeswhichentitled theirholders torule themselves,
although under the dominion of the overlord who granted the privileges.4
Liberty was absolute and meant exposure to external threat; liberties were
relative and meant protection within a hierarchical structure – protection
givento inferiorsandreceivedfromsuperiors.Liberties thuscorrespondedto
the graduated structure of feudal societies, still very present in early modern
Europe, while liberty stemmed from the classical, neo-Roman tradition that
eventually became the core of the individualist theory of natural rights.5 This
chapter will discuss the co-existence of such different notions of freedom in
1. I thank Julia Bernheim (IAS Princeton) and Quentin Skinner for their great help in editing this
paper in English.
2. Fro¨schl 1994. 3. Bahlcke 1997.
4. See also Lee, Chapter 14 in this book, for the German tradition of liberties as privileges.
5. Conze et al. 2004; Skinner 1998; Schreiner 1991.
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the two federal republics that lasted until the Napoleonic era: the United
Provinces of the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation. With a focus on
religious freedom, the question will also be posed why a modern concept of
liberty appeared first in theNetherlands and onlymuch later in Switzerland.
To understand the meaning of ‘vrijheid’ and ‘Freiheit’ in the two fed-
erations, a preliminary look at their constitutions is necessary. They reveal
considerable differences, but alsomajor similarities, especially if the political
structures are compared as ideal types to dynastic monarchies.6 In general,
the contrasts can be summarised as follows. Government was institution-
alised essentially on a provincial or local level; actually, the Dutch provinces
and the Swiss cantons claimed sovereignty for themselves. The central gov-
ernment of the federation was weak and lacked administrative and military
efficiency.Therewasno real court, and theSwissConfederation, essentially a
defensive league,didnotevenhaveacapital. ItsDietwasheldonlya fewtimes
a year as a meeting of envoys in order to discuss common issues, but lacked
directive powers: the sovereign cantons could decline whatever was decided
at the Diet. In contrast, the States-General in The Hague already guaran-
teed some centralised unity, and so did theGrand Pensionary, theCouncil of
State and above all the house ofOrange that usually provided the stadtholder
of Holland, Zealand and Utrecht, who was simultaneously captain-general
of theconfederatearmyintimesofwarandalsoclaimedpolitical leadership in
timesof peace. Still, the two republics couldnotdominate territories theway
that dynastic (and absolutist) states could. Even with a dynastic element like
the house of Orange, they were forced to find shared solutions for structural
and political problems and thus compelled to collaborate within networks.
Government both in the predominant cities and in the rural communities
was polyarchic and co-opted new members of the ruling elite through elec-
tion, not through hereditary succession. These elites were mostly urban and
bourgeois, not aristocratic; the basis of their social and political power was
economic enterprise, not warfare. This, however, occasioned internal strife
insofar as the rural provinces as well as the rural cantons were economically
less developed andquite dependent onwarfare – in the Swiss case,mercenary
services. Close to the urban areas, however, manufacturing and the putting-
out system played a relatively large role in both republics, compared with
the rather agricultural monarchies. So did trade, which was extremely inter-
national in the Dutch case and often crossed borders in Switzerland. Com-
petitive exchange was the rule, not regulation and coercion in a mercantilist
6. See here my introductory remarks in Holenstein et al. 2008: 11–26.
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system; again, this applied more to the Dutch, as guilds played a major eco-
nomic role in Switzerland.The armywas amilitia, strengthened in theDutch
case by mercenary troops (quite a few from Switzerland); it was not a stand-
ing professional army as established in the big monarchies in the second half
of the seventeenth century.While the latter were imposing religious unifor-
mity, the federal republics permitteddifferent kinds of religious coexistence.
Several of these observations had already been made by early modern
commentators.7 They also developed the opposition between repressive
monarchies and republican liberty thathas inspiredmoderndiscussions asso-
ciated with authors such as Hans Baron, John Pocock or Quentin Skinner
who have focused on Renaissance Italy and then on seventeenth-century
England, but not on the continental federal republics. The latter, and espe-
cially the Dutch, have slowly made their way during recent decades into
the discussions of republicanism.8 However, comparative studies are still
rare, although a first essay, Jean Franc¸ois Le Petit’s Nederlantsche Republy-
cke . . . geconfereert ende vergelekenmet die van de Swytersche cantoenen, appeared
as early as 1615. Le Petit pointed out that both countries became ‘vry¨e
Republy¨cke’ thanks to a similar fight for ‘vryheydt’ against Habsburg rule,
as personified by the Austrian duke Leopold III and the Spanish king Philip
II.9 Especially in the second half of the seventeenth century, both Dutch
and Swiss authors displayed historical and political similarities. During the
DutchWar thatLouisXIVhadprecipitated in1672, an anonymouspamphlet
was printed: L’affermissement des republiques de Hollande & de Suisse (1675). It
advocated an alliance between republics, and especially between the Dutch
and the Swiss. A common past of defending themselves against the Hab-
sburgs should unite them; the patrons of the alliance would be the Swiss
Blessed Nicholas of Flu¨e, William of Orange, the first liberator of Holland
(‘le premier Liberateur de la Hollande’), and William Tell, who established the
liberty of the Swiss (‘le fondateur de la liberte´ des Suisses’). Liberte´ essentially
means ‘independence’ in this context, but it is specifically the independence
of a free state as opposed to the monarchical constitution which is not only
repudiated in the case of Louis XIV, but also seen as a general threat: ‘Toute
sorte de Couronnes absolue¨s & Ministres souverains doivent estre suspectes aux
7. Davids and Lucassen 1995.
8. For a bibliographical essay see Kossmann 2000a: 19–23, who mentions among others Haitsma
Mulier 1987; Mout 1988; Van Gelderen 1992; on ‘Dutch republicanism’ see particularly
Kossmann 2000a: 169–93.
9. Le Petit 1615, dedication and 387, 422–3, 446–8, 465; see also Van Schelven 1947: 753–4. For
more recent comparative approaches see Holenstein 2008.
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Republicains’ – all kinds of absolutist crowns and sovereign ministers must
make republicans suspicious.10
Such language was not common at the time, especially not in the Swiss
cantons that only rarely referred to themselves as ‘republics’ and still less as
‘republicans’. They were still obsessed with religious strife and confessional
loyalties. Indeed, besides the historical communities of the two countries,
the anonymous author of the Affermissement also mentioned that even in
religion they were similar, but then went on to maintain that religion no
longer played a role in the building of alliances. It was a secular pact that the
Affermissement proposed against the threat of royal absolutism. Thus Liberty
became a secular mark of similarity between the two federal republics that
until thenhadusuallyunderlined their commonCalvinist faith–at least those
whowere actually Calvinist. In theNetherlands, there was an important but
politically marginalised Catholic minority, while in Switzerland there was
evenamajorityof sevenCatholic althoughmostlypetty cantons.Fiveof them
fought three minor civil wars against the big Protestant cantons of Zurich
and Berne in 1531, 1656 and 1712; Basel and Schaffhausen, both Reformed,
remained neutral in those conflicts. By exclusively insisting on ‘liberty’ as
a common ground, the Affermissement tried to address both confessional
groups in Switzerland as potential allies and providers of mercenaries who
were then monopolised by the French.
This endeavour failed during the Dutch War, but emerged again when
theWar of the Grand Alliance (1688–97) broke out. At this time, the United
Provinces sent an extraordinary envoy to Switzerland: Petrus Valkenier.
In an earlier publication on the current troubles of Europe, Valkenier had
already written that the two countries should unite in their defence of lib-
erty, because their shared republican form of government was despised by
all potentates everywhere.11 Blaming Louis XIV for dealing with sovereign
republics as if they were his subjects, Valkenier deliberately used the lan-
guage of modern constitutional law in addressing the Confederation as an
absolute, independent, sovereignandequallyneutral republic: ‘Absolute, Inde-
pendente, Souveraine und zugleich auch Neutrale Republic.’12 These were excep-
tional words at least to Swiss ears unused to the language of constitutional
and international law that stemmed from authors such as Jean Bodin and
Hugo Grotius. What Valkenier sought to stress was that the Confederation,
being both a sovereign and a neutral state, was not unilaterally bound by
its earlier alliances to France, but could also hire out mercenaries to the
10. L’affermissement 1675: 20–1, 35, 45. 11. Valkenier 1677: 56. 12. Valkenier 1690: 4.
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United Provinces. Valkenier added several elements to the list of geographic
and historical similarities between the two countries that predecessors like
the Affermissement had established. It included the constitution, a defensive
foreign policy without expansionism, and the desire for justice, profitable
commerce and the development of factories. The harmony and sympathy
that the two republics shared, according to Valkenier, should naturally lead
to a security pact directednotonly against France, but as amatter of principle
against allmonarchies, becausemonarchies resented republics in general and
would overthrow them as soon as possible if the free states did not protect
themselves throughprudent treaties.13 In 1693, Valkenier’s arguments even-
tually won in the Protestant cantons: Zurichwas the first to sign a treaty and
send a battalion of mercenaries to the Dutch – thereby breaking the French
monopoly on mercenaries.
Why was the political language of the Dutch unusual to Swiss ears,
although it encompassed constitutional similarities that seem obvious to
present-day readers? Only in these years did the fundamental difference
between monarchies and republics become a real issue of Swiss statesmen
and of political thought as far as there was any in the Confederation. To put
it bluntly: itwasmostly theDutch, but e negativo also the French,who taught
the Swiss ‘republicanism’ tobeunderstood as a theoretical reflectionbothon
sovereignty and on the problemof political freedom.That such a theoretical,
legal approach to the issue emerged only late, in the seventeenth century,
may sound surprising, because the Swiss Confederation wasmuch older and
had claimed freedom as its particular distinction for some time. Its origins
dated back to the fourteenth century, and from the late fifteenth century on
the tales of William Tell, his comrades and their oath of federation against
tyranny had been part of national history and legitimation. In the most
sophisticated of these narratives, the Chronicon Helveticum (1563), Aegidius
Tschudi interpreted the revolt against the Habsburgs as regaining original
liberty that the Swiss, or rather theHelvetians, had already possessed before
the Roman conquest.14 This became one of the many humanist founding
narratives that began with Leonardo Bruni’s Etrurians and went on with
Etienne Pasquier’s Nos anceˆtres les Gaulois or Grotius’s presentation of the
Batavians in his De antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae (1610).
As for the United Provinces, they had started their revolt against the
Spanish Habsburgs in the late 1560s, much later than the Swiss had started
theirs against the Austrian branch of the dynasty. Their independence could
13. Valkenier 1693. 14. Tschudi 1980: 224; see also pp. 23*–26* and Stettler 2001.
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be dated, at the earliest, to the Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinghe),
signed by seventeen provinces in 1581. The legitimacy of this act, deposing
a king of divine right, was even more doubtful than in the Swiss case. That
was one reason why the Dutch almost desperately tried to find a new king,
a French or an English prince, or even a woman, Queen Elizabeth. Their
rebellion was not a revolution against monarchy and monarchs in principle;
it was directed against one very specific tyrant who had violated their good
traditional rights and customs. The very first article in the Union of Utrecht
in 1579, another founding document of the United Provinces, noted that
the Dutch ‘provinces will form an alliance, confederation, and union among
themselves . . . in order to . . . retain undiminished its special and particular
privileges, franchises, exemptions’.15 Liberty hence meant independence,
provincial autonomy and religious toleration as a collective right.16 It was
only when the Dutch could not find a new king respectful of their privi-
leges (the dominium politicum et regale) that they slowly realised that they had
become what they had not intended to be: a republic.17 And it was only
in the mid seventeenth century that a coherent theory of this republic was
developed by authors such as the brothers De la Court and Spinoza.18
During the Eighty Years War, Dutch political thought was rather tradi-
tional and pragmatic, and focused less on philosophy than on history, as in
Grotius’s De antiquitate. Following the Aristotelian scheme, he and others
defined the United Provinces as a mixed state, characterised by a monarchi-
cal element – the stadtholder – and the urban aristocracies. To justify their
unusual constitution, the Dutch also looked to foreign parallels. The dia-
logue Emanuel-Erneste, probably written by Gerard Prouninck van Deventer
in 1580, rejected the Swiss model, because the effeminate Dutch lacked the
‘ancient military discipline’ of the Confederates and were addicted to the
15. Quoted in translation from Rowen 1972: 70. 16. Kossmann 1991: 286.
17. For the dominium politicum et regale see Koenigsberger 1986.
18. In this I follow Kossmann 2000a: 25–129, and Secretan 1990. Skinner 1978 and Van Gelderen
1992 offer a more modern reading of the founding texts of the Dutch republic. Like Kossmann
2000a: 133–66, I would, however, understand the rather rare notions of e.g. ‘popular
sovereignty’ (Van Gelderen 1992: 209–12, 265–6) in a more traditional way, similar to their use
in Althusius, whom the liberal German-American interpretation of C. J. Friedrich may also have
made too much a modern constitutional federalist. Reacting to Jean Bodin’s theory of
sovereignty, German authors writing especially on the imperial ius publicum distinguished the
maiestas realis of the empire from the maiestas personalis of the emperor. Such models of double
sovereignty can legitimate a ‘nation’ as a whole bearing maiestas realis, if it opposes, as in the
case of the Netherlands and Philip II, a king or tyrant with his maiestas personalis. I would
maintain, against both Friedrich and Van Gelderen, that such a legitimation stems from the
medieval idea of contractualism (dominium politicum et regale) and refers to the right of resistance
in extremis, not to everyday republican rule within the body politic.
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delights of the courts.19 Three years later, a Discours that sought to expound
the best way to govern the United Provinces contested this affirmation and
recommended the Swiss constitution. TheDiscours considered it an imperium
mixtum, but, unlikeGrotius, as one consisting of both aristocracy anddemoc-
racy: ‘the government of the best nobles and the wisest citizens’ which came
to power through election.20
At the same time, Josias Simler gave a similar interpretation of the Con-
federation.He belonged to one of the best families of Zurich andwas related
to Ulrich Zwingli. Furthermore, he would remain the international author-
ity on the Swiss constitution far into the eighteenth century, because his
book De republica Helvetiorum, printed in 1576, was translated into German,
French and Dutch and often reprinted. If one considers the marginal role of
nobility inSwitzerlandandespecially if one considers the laterSwissnational
ideology referring to apactbetweenburghers andpeasants, an interpretation
stressing the aristocratic aspect of the Swiss constitution may seem strange.
Simler, however, not only contested the allegations of rebellion when he
adopted the Aristotelian concept of the mixed constitution and insisted
that the ‘good’ nobility had participated in the defence of the Swiss liberties
against theHabsburg reeves, but alsomade clear that in doing so theConfed-
erates had remainedmost loyal to the empire. The reeves had tried to alienate
the empire’s territories by subduing them; the Swiss had safeguarded them.
Liberty, in the case of the Confederation, did not mean liberation from the
empire, but liberty through andwithin the empire.21 Liberty was a privilege
in the sense defined above, granted by the imperial, universal source of all
legitimate secular power. This did not necessarily relate to a specific emperor
who had accorded the privilege; after all, not much could be expected from
the Habsburgs who had provided all emperors from 1438 onwards. The
Swiss rather referred to the empire as an institutional framework that had
established the legitimate basis for the cantons’ lordship in their respective
territories. Furthermore, only this ideal concept of empire could explain the
archaic Swiss mixture of powers and privileges that generally belonged to
the cantons, but to a small extent also to the Confederation itself.
The Swiss remained ideologically within the weak late medieval empire
that had lacked almost all state institutions until 1495, when the Diet
19. Van Schelven 1947: 750–1; for Emanuel-Erneste see Mout 1988: 175, and Van Gelderen 1992:
171–2.
20. Discours 1583: fol. b2; Van Schelven 1947: 747–51, 754; Mout 1988: 178–9; Van Gelderen 1992:
187–91; Mo¨rke 1999: 51–2.
21. Simler 1577: 4.
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(Reichstag) of Worms agreed on reform and on a more integrative structure
of the empire.22 The Confederates did not follow: neither did they become
part of the imperial circle estates (Reichskreise) established to carry out the
perpetual public peace agreed to inWorms, nor did they accept the imperial
chamber court in Speyer and its practice of RomanLaw. The Swiss cities had
never been diligent visitors to the imperial diet and now stopped going there
completely; nor did they receive any orders from the emperor. However,
the Swiss cantons bore the empire’s two-headed eagle on their coats of arms
until well after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, when they received their
‘exemption’, their complete liberation from imperial jurisdiction. Formally,
this was just another privilege granted within imperial law. However, with
the spread of international law and the ‘Westphalian system’, the exemption
was soon interpreted as independence and sovereignty, both in diplomatic
practice and in legal theory.
The model for a republic in this system of monarchical sovereigns was
originally Venice, but in the secondhalf of the seventeenth century it became
chiefly the successful United Provinces. The Dutch revolt had started as a
defence of privileges against the Spanish. But the publication of Bodin’s Six
livres de la re´publique in 1576 changed the way of thinking about political
rule and its legitimacy. A Brief discourse justified the Dutch resistance as early
as 1579 with sovereign rights, reserved to the States-General.23 They were
ready to offer Franc¸ois d’Anjou – the French king’s brother – the title of a
‘defender of liberty’, but refrained from adding the adjective ‘sovereign’ to
the title, although he had claimed it on the advice of his personal counsel-
lor Bodin. The Dutch feared that the French would understand it exactly
in Bodin’s sense as transfer of the ‘puissance absolue’.24 In his Corte ver-
thoninghe of 1587, Franc¸ois Vranck solved the problem by declaring that
the States-General replaced the absent prince in representing the country’s
sovereignty. The regents and their councils thus became absolute rulers in
their cities,without an interferingpower above them,be it the formerkingor
the stadtholder.25 Accordingly, the United Provinces insisted on attributes
of sovereignty in diplomatic contacts, such as the title ‘ambassador’ for their
diplomats, granted by France, England and Venice after the truce of 1609.26
22. See also Lee, Chapter 14 in this book, for the Diet of Worms and the Reichsreform.
23. Van Gelderen 1993: 136–9; see also xxiii–xxiv and Van Gelderen 1992: 144–5.
24. Secretan 1990: 77–82, 91–8, 91 for the quotation; Griffiths 1970: 73–7; Kossmann 2000a:
144–6.
25. Van Gelderen 1992: 199–207; Secretan 1990: 106–11.
26. Besold 1624: 127–45, 138 (Praecedentia) for the quotation.
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The States-General referred to this exact precedent and to their 1639 Cere-
monialewhen their ambassadors defended their role as representing a strong
and sovereign state, ‘een Souveraine ende maghtige Staet representerende’,
during the negotiations in Westphalia.27 At that point it was the French
who started contesting the Dutch position in protocol. As for Spain, in the
peace treaty of 30 January 1648 it accepted the United Provinces as ‘liberos
& supremos Ordines, provincias ac terras’, which the French translated as
‘libres et souverains Etats, provinces et pays’, free and sovereign estates,
provinces and lands.28
The relation with the empire was not mentioned in the peace treaty and
hence remained ambiguous, so that some Germans contested the complete
independence of the United Provinces.29 But unlike the Swiss exemption,
the treaty with Spain was made on the basis of international law. Monarchs,
and eventually even their life-long foe Louis XIV, accepted the Netherlands
as sovereign and consequently as their peer.30 The Dutch referred to their
sovereignty when they spoke of aurea libertas as Hendrick de Keyzer named
one allegory on William the Silent’s tomb in Delft (1621).31 Accordingly,
DirkGraswinckel defined libertas as the synonym forwhatmonarchies called
majestas: the sovereign power to legislate without any restrictions from a
terrestrial power.32 Arguably, Paulus Busius was the first Dutch writer not
only to discuss Bodin, but to clarify that the sovereignty of a republic was
as absolute as that of a king: ‘ImperiumReipublicae summum et absolutum,
seu Potestas reipublicae suprema et legibus soluta.’33
This was the lesson the Swiss still had to learn after French diplomats
hinted at the Dutch example in the run-up to theWestphalian negotiations:
like the States-General, theConfederates should not refer to privileges,weak
27. Wicquefort 1719, i: 189–95; the Dutch position also in Stieve 1715: 372–8; Heringa 1961: 327;
Anderson 1993: 60, 65.
28. Dethlefs 1998: 76; see also Dickmann 1977: 208–9, 302–4.
29. For German inhibitions in dealing with the Netherlands as a sovereign state, see Gabel 1999:
27, 34–5. Among those who still claimed the United Provinces for the empire was Leibniz in his
De Jure Suprematus ac Legationis Principum Germaniae (1677) and Gedancken zum Entwurff der
Teu¨tschen KriegsVerfassung (1681), see Leibniz 1963: 136 (ch. 32), 579.
30. Fro¨schl 1981: 284; Anderson 1993: 60; Roosen 1980: 457.
31. Gamboni and Germann 1991: 60, no. 37; see also Koenigsberger 1997: 66; Kossmann 1991:
284–6; and Haitsma Mulier and Velema 1999, especially the contributions of Martin van
Gelderen and HansW. Blom.
32. Haitsma Mulier 1980: 102.
33. Paulus Busius, Illustrium Disquisitionum Politicarum Liber, Franeker 1613, quoted in Visentin
1998: 74; for Busius see also Kossmann 2000a: 33–6, and Mout 1988: 186–7. Bodin deeply
influenced Grotius’s De Indis/De jure praedae, written in 1604/5; but the work was printed only
in 1868.
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titles within imperial law, but rather claim the liberty that they had won
and defended themselves by force of arms – and not received from anyone
else.34 Although the Swiss envoy in Mu¨nster accordingly claimed that he
wanted to keep the time-honoured sovereignty of his country intact,
he eventually was not concerned when he only received the mentioned title
of ‘exemption’.35 It copedmuchbetterwith the Swiss situation than the con-
cept of ‘sovereignty’, which implied difficult questions: who, after all, was
sovereign, theConfederation itself or the cantons?Hence, it is not surprising
that the petty Catholic cantons, thosewhich feared the superiority of the big
Protestant cantons Zurich and Berne, should have ideologically gone on to
justify their statehood within the framework of the empire. Nidwalden and
Obwalden adorned their town halls with two-headed eagles as late as 1714
and 1733 respectively, and Obwalden, Appenzell Innerrhoden and Schwyz
minted coins with two-headed eagles into the 1740s.
But even in the Reformed cities, a deliberate shift from imperial sym-
bols to the modern ones representing republican sovereignty only rarely
occurred, as in 1698 when Zurich built a new town hall according to a clear
political and artistic concept.36 Well into the eighteenth century, liberty or
rather libertates in the plural meant, for most Swiss, essentially the privileges
to rule and to judge, which the emperor had accorded them in the late Mid-
dle Ages. These were collective privileges owned by the Swiss cities or rural
communities. To belong to such a collective, one had to be a citizenwith full
rights, which meant being personally free, not a serf, politically free, not a
subject, owning property andde facto also belonging to one of the governing
(regimentsfa¨hige) families. The latter could be very limited, fewer than a hun-
dred families in a big canton such as Berne, although theoretically all male
adults in the ruling cities and rural cantons could claim full citizenship. To
borrowIsaiahBerlin’s terms: theSwiss cantons enjoyednegative libertyboth
from andwithin the empire, which remained the all-encompassing universal
structure for someof themuntil about1750; and thecitizensenjoyedpositive
liberty within their respective cantonswhere they participated practically or
theoretically in government or at least profited from economic privileges.37
Positive liberty, but also merely living in the Swiss cantons, depended
furthermore on some preconditions that were so obvious that they did not
even have to be declared. Citizens and subjects equally had to adapt to
34. Eidgeno¨ssische Abschiede, v, 2: 1383.
35. Eidgeno¨ssische Abschiede, v, 2: 2268–9; also 2262; Wettstein 1651: 17; Gauss and Stoecklin 1953:
193–4.
36. For examples see Maissen 2006: 383–400, 431–567. 37. Berlin 1958; Skinner 2002d.
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uniformity, particularly in the religious field. There was no negative liberty
in the modern individualist sense of, for example, freedom of conscience,
freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of public worship.
The two confessions cohabitated only on the highest political level, the
Confederation and its diet, while in general, Catholics and Protestants were
clearly separated inmono-confessional cantons.Appenzellwas even formally
divided according to confessional lines, and the same thing happened de
facto toGlarus, the only bi-confessional canton. Therewas a denominational
mixture within some joint dependencies (Gemeine Herrschaft) because they
were ruled by cantons of a different creed. In those areas, especially in the
Thurgau, Protestants and Catholics could even live in the same village and
sometimes shared the local church (simultaneum). Thus they were forced
to develop secular strategies of cohabitation and informal rules, a political
culture of avoiding clashes on religious issues.
Behind such behaviour, there was no respect for the other confession, let
alone toleration,butmerely thepragmatic insight that civilwarswereaworse
evil than coping with the unloved neighbour. Such pragmatism was a sacri-
fice, andmany peoplewere not ready for it, as for exampleGiovanni Baptista
Stuppa, a Calvinist from the Grisons and a lieutenant-colonel in a regiment
commanded by his brother Peter Stuppa that helped Louis XIV invade the
Netherlands. In his pamphlet La religion des Hollandais (1673),which was
even printed in English (1680), Giovanni Baptista Stuppa tried to convince
his fellow Swiss Reformed that any solidarity with the Dutch Calvinists was
misplaced. Unlike the Swiss, they were not sincere Calvinists, but had estab-
lished that same faith as a ‘publick Religion . . . out of pure interest of State’.
The proof of religious indifferencewas that ‘theUnited Provinces did not only
permit the exercise of all sorts of Religions, but did also reject as Tyrannical,
all the Laws, whereby there was any prescription made for Uniformity of
Sentiments’. Hence the Dutch provinces were full of sectarians, and they
extended toleration even to a Jew called Spinoza, who was about ‘to destroy
all Religions, and particularly the Jewish and the Christian, and to introduce
Atheisme, Libertinisme, and the free Toleration of all Religions’.38
When arguing against the freedom of religion, Stuppa could appeal to
convictions that most people shared in early modern Europe. A ruler who
tolerateddifferent denominationswas considered religiously indifferent and
thus provoked the wrath of God against him and his nation. In a more secu-
lar perspective, to be fellow-citizens meant sharing convictions and values;
38. Stuppa 1680: 6, 10, 29; see also Van Gelderen 2008: 151–3.
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mostEuropeans agreed thatmulti-religious societies lacked a commonmoral
basis and thereforewould suffer discord, vice and crime.Moreover, religious
minorities could become a fifth column and side with the enemywho shared
their faith, or they could try to become a political body of their own and
split the nation. Religious unification was a precondition for political unity,
especially in republics. As they lacked a kingwho couldmake quick decisions
and impose equal rules on everyone, they were considered as suffering from
political inefficiency and discord. Because of these shortcomings in institu-
tional structure, the moral appeal to unity and concord was omnipresent in
the republics and manifest in historiography, rhetoric and illustrations.39
In Stuppa’s view, certainly not disinterested, but also in the view ofmost
of his contemporaries, individual freedomwas a deadly menace to collective
liberty. It could provoke instability and anarchy, and end in civil war, and
that was what republics had to fear most. The identification of liberty with
anarchy was one of the strongest rhetorical weapons of absolutist kings who
liked to point at the English interregnum or the French fronde to show the
effects of diversity when tolerated. Seen from an early modern perspective,
Stuppa condemninghis fellowCalvinists in theNetherlands is less surprising
than Dutch toleration itself: why did the Dutch not only concede religious
freedom, but even justify it theoretically?
As a matter of fact, not only William of Orange but also some regents
had proclaimed ‘freedom of religion’ from the beginning of the revolt, first
in 1572. According to article xiii of the Union of Utrecht, all individuals
enjoyed freedom of religion. During the Reformation in general, that claim,
however, was not a matter of principle, but provisory and instrumental.
The Reformed asked for freedom of religion until their own faith, the only
true one, would become the creed of the majority. Consequently, the Dutch
Calvinists and the regents as well, who feared discord within their cities,
proved from the 1570s onwards their intolerance not only of Catholics, but
also of Lutherans, Anabaptists and Jews. The Reformed infighting between
Arminians and Counter-Remonstrants took place to impose the right con-
viction, not to foster toleration. It was only after the Arminians officially
lost that battle at the Synod of Dordrecht (1618) that some of them, like
Johannes Uyttenbogaert and Simon Episcopius, developed in the late 1620s
their irenic and latitudinarian positions of connivance into a more general
idea of toleration as liberation from any kind of coercion in matters of reli-
gious conscience.40
39. Van Gelderen 2008; Maissen 2008. 40. Israel 1995: 372–7; 1997: 3–11, 18–21.
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Whatwasparticular to theNetherlands, however,was that theArminians
(and whoever else wanted) could refer to an admired intellectual tradition
going back to Erasmus of Rotterdam, who had insisted more on moral
integrity (philosophia Christi) than on dogmatic orthodoxy, distinguishing
between fundamentalia and adiaphora, essential elements and rites that were
neither compulsory nor forbidden. There were always, in the Netherlands,
convinced advocates of that Erasmian kind of toleration, which remained
limited to the dialogue between Christian denominations. With this reser-
vation, these Dutch authors wentmuch further than Zwingli and his fellows
who were, however, also deeply shaped by other aspects of Erasmus’s teach-
ing. In his famous dispute with Justus Lipsius, Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert
insisted not only on the moral value of toleration, but also on its political
benefit. According to him, it was not religious difference but persecution
of supposed heretics that caused civic discord.41 With a similar irenic goal,
Hugo Grotius promoted an Erasmian and latitudinarian church (similar to
the Anglican one) under public control with a minimal creed in order to
avoid discord on religious grounds, thus preparing for Hobbes’s reduction
of public faith to the sentence ‘Jesus is the Christ.’ Historiography should
take the place of theology as the ideological foundation of society. In the
humanist tradition, Grotius insisted not on religious uniformity, but on the
individual virtue of the citizens as a precondition for good political order.
He was elitist and indifferent in constitutional matters. An aristocrat could
be virtuous, but so could a king; it was essentially a matter of education.42
In theNetherlands, systematic republican thought – claiming the superi-
ority of the free state as opposed to monarchies in general and including not
only a modern notion of individual liberty, but also a new reasoning about
toleration – startedonly in the footprints ofDescartes andHobbes in themid
seventeenth century. That implied a methodological shift, because human
beingswere no longer considered, as in the humanist tradition, as differently
gifted subjects of good education. They were seen as objects of their own
passions and emotions and hence as essentially equal in these shortcomings.
Pieter and Johan de la Court adopted not only this negative anthropology of
Hobbes, but also his understanding of a dreadful state of nature and of the
sovereign state to escape it. Their solution, however, was not a monarchical
Leviathan: if mankind was wicked, a king would be so too, and even more
than powerless people. The imperfect nature of man asked for a republic
41. Van Gelderen 2008: 160–2; Israel 1997: 6–7.
42. Van Gelderen 2008: 162–4; Kossmann 2000a: 31–6.
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whose citizens would themselves enact the rational laws to which they then
would submit.43 For the brothers De la Court, liberty consisted no longer in
the defence of collective privileges, but in the freedomof an individual prop-
erty owner. A major freedom was that of religious conscience and religious
expression that individuals hadhad in the state of nature and could keep even
after they agreed on the social contract. This was the case especially if they
lived in a commercial republic like the United Provinces, where people from
all over the world and therefore with differing beliefs came in contact. Thus,
dissenting private faith should generally be tolerated, while the brothers
De la Court believed that the state (and not a church) should define the rules
of publicworship in order to control all churches and avoid clashes of zealous
priests.44
Following the brothers De la Court and his own teacher Franciscus van
den Enden, Spinoza insisted even more on the necessity that the state con-
trolled the ius circa sacra and the clergy, and maintained public worship of a
(civic) religion with a limited number of core tenets oriented towards public
peace.45 In spite of many similarities, Spinoza’s plea was more existential
than that of De la Court, who supported toleration with a pragmatic negli-
gence for matters of truth, while Spinoza fought for freedom of thought in
a general sense, as a human and social need and as a means to overcomemys-
tery and superstition.His positionwas unlike the ‘Arminian’ tradition going
fromEpiscopius to its late exponent John Locke, which conceded toleration
as a privilege that the state accorded to some organised congregations (but
not to Catholics or ‘atheists’) in order to enable their coexistence and the
believers’ spiritual redemption. For Spinoza, tolerationwas not a concession
to churches, that is to autonomous collectives. It was the result of individual
freedom in its both morally and politically most important form, the liber-
tas philosophandi.46 Locke still wrote about liberties, privileges granted by a
state ruling whether a particular position served the common weal or not,
whereas Spinoza postulated liberty, a natural and unconditional right that
the state must not touch, but must guarantee within a legal system adopted
by a collective sovereign.
43. De la Court 1661: 256, 263–7; see also De la Court 1662: 105–10 (5, 4), 145–50 (5, 9), and 1669:
66, 401. For further information on the brothers see Blom andWildenberg 1986.
44. De la Court 1662: 23 (4, 3).
45. Spinoza 1994a: 285–98 (ch. 19); for Van den Enden see Israel 2001: 175–7.
46. For a comparison of Spinoza and Locke see Israel 2000; 2001: 265–70; 1997: 25–30, who puts
the De la Court brothers and Spinoza in two different categories (‘liberal regents’ versus
‘radical republicans’) which may be more justified when speaking about their consequences
than about their position among contemporaries.
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Spinoza’s individualism was essentially Hobbesian. He also perceived
the social contract as the product of affects insofar as individuals – with all
their defects, but using their major asset: reason – wanted to escape fear
and despair in a purely egotistical attempt to save themselves (conatus sese
conservandi). What emerged out of such a negative anthropology was not
aristocracy, as was the tendency at least with Pieter de la Court. Spinoza
pointed to democracy as ‘the most natural form of state, approaching most
closely to that freedom which nature grants to every man’.47 Furthermore,
democracy was the only truly absolutist government, since the ruler and the
ruled were the same: a continuous assembly of citizens decided on the spot
what was right and what was wrong, without obligations to other parties or
to custom. ‘For if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact, that which
is held by an entire multitude.’48 This absolutist democracy corresponded
best to the original freedom and equality in the state of nature and at the
same time it guaranteed individual freedom in the state of society because
every citizen participated in political decisions. According to Spinoza’s last
chapter in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, everyone was allowed to think,
to believe and to say what he wanted in a free democratic state whose true
purpose was, for its part, freedom (of the individual).49
The brothers De la Court and Spinoza, both inspired by Hobbes, thus
developed a coherent liberal and republican tradition in the Netherlands.
Theirs was a radical solution even for the United Provinces, although the
issue of toleration was rooted in the earlier traditions of Dutch thinking
mentioned above. The brothers De la Court and Spinoza wrote their books
during the so-called waare vrijheid, the two decades of ‘true liberty’ when
the urban patricians with Jan de Witt at their head ruled without a princely
stadtholder.When Louis XIV invaded the Netherlands in 1672 and DeWitt
was murdered by the populace in The Hague,William of Orange was imme-
diately appointed stadtholder. His supporters embraced people like Petrus
Valkenier, who was later to reside in Switzerland as mentioned above and
who was not less a convinced republican than a convinced Calvinist. His
kind showed little interest in issues such as toleration, but defended the
right of resistance according to theMonarchomach tradition.Most of all, for
obvious reasons these Orangists adhered to the older, Grotian paradigm of
the mixed constitution, with the States-General as the aristocratic part and
47. Spinoza 2007: 243; see also Israel 2001: 270–2.
48. Spinoza 1951: 347 (8, 3); see also the chapters on sovereignty in Spinoza 2007: 208–37;
furthermore Haitsma Mulier 1980: 170–208.
49. Spinoza 2007: 252 (20, 6).
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the stadtholder as the monarchical head of the political body. According to
them, the individual virtueof the few, andnotpolitical institutionsmatching
universal imperfection, should keep the political machine running.
One of these republican thinkers was Gerard de Vries, a professor at
the university of Utrecht, a champion of empiricism, a teacher of natural
law from Grotius to Pufendorf and a declared foe of Machiavelli, Descartes
andHobbes.50 De Vries defended the classical and humanist conviction that
honestum and utilemust and could be combined in politics. De Vries matters
here because a young student from Zurich, Johann Caspar Escher, wrote
his thesis under his supervision. Escher was to become mayor of Zurich
in 1740, but in 1697 he was just one of the many Swiss Protestants who
studied in the Netherlands.51 In his thesis on the liberty of the people,
Exercitatio politica de libertate populi, Escher started by condemning Hobbes
and princely absolutism and by defining liberty through a quotation from
Cicero, one of his favourite authors: Libertas est potestas vivendi ut velis.52 Such
a freedom to live as one wants should not be understood in a libertine or in
a liberal way. For Cicero, to be free implied the control of one’s passions;
Escher added the obligation to follow the duties imposed by God. The
assumption that equality had ruled in the state of nature convinced Escher
that the original government was democratic, because it allowed individual
citizens to enjoy an equal degree of liberty. Out of this original democracy,
monarchyor aristocracy coulddevelop later because theyweremore efficient
in controlling whatever evil the original sin bred among humans.53
If Escher conceded non-democratic constitutions as legitimate though
imperfect options, he regretted that they would not preserve man’s original
liberties in an integral way. Furthermore, he repeatedly insisted that rulers
had to stick both to the fundamental law and to the duties which they had to
fulfil themselves as pious citizens without confining the libertas populi tacita,
the unuttered liberty of the people. Assuming a people ceded unconditional
power to a ruler, that cession would be void, because the citizens would
thereby act against God’s order to preserve themselves. The libertas imperan-
tis, the ruler’s liberty to do what he wanted, must be limited, and the more
it was, the larger the libertas populi. It was protected best through a contract
which ensured the explicit (expressa) liberty of the people, its fundamental
50. On De Vries see Kossmann 2000a: 93–7; Veen 1976: 233–4: Israel 2001: 479–80.
51. For Escher’s life see Maissen 2006: 402–5, and the older biographies of Wyss 1790 and
Keller-Escher 1885: 102–30.
52. The Exercitatio has recently been edited byWerner Widmer, see Escher 2008: 564 for the
quotation from Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 34.
53. Escher 2008: 580–6.
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laws and privileges and in particular religion, life, wealth and the election
of lower magistrates.54 It is noteworthy that Escher distinguished between
a bad ruler and a tyrant: the former could be bloodthirsty and even despise
God and religion, but still respect ‘public liberty’; the latter was ready to
violate the people’s liberty, be it for the public weal (salus Reipublicae). Of all
rulers, Escher presented Augustus as a tyrant and referred to JohnMilton in
maintaining that a sovereign forfeited his title by the very fact of becoming
an absolute ruler and thus a tyrant. And if as a tyrant he no longer respected
the jura ac libertas civiumwhich he had granted in the social contract, without
a doubt the people or rather the lower magistrates had the right to resist
their prince and even kill him.55
Escher thus combined elements of natural law probably taken from
Pufendorf and the Dutchman (of Swiss origin) Ulric Huber56 with the
Calvinist right of resistance found in Beza’s De iure magistratuum, while his
discussion of iura ac libertates referred to the medieval concept of (imperial)
privileges. Several elementswere not alien to Spinoza: democracy as the con-
stitution closest to original equality and liberty in the state of nature; refusal
of arbitrary rule; insistence on the right of resistance against it. But Escher
did not have to read Spinoza to defend such positions that may have been
deemed outrageous everywhere except among many Dutch authors. The
republican De Vries, who repudiated Spinoza’s ‘irreligious’ ideas, obviously
did not object to his student’s assertions.
However, Escher met resistance when he defended his eclectic thesis in
Utrecht in a public disputation. In an autobiographical sketch, he later nar-
rated the discussion that arose because he had maintained in his sixteenth
thesis that the political authorities must uphold the unanimous religious
creed of the people, once it had been defined by consensus populi and became
a fundamental law. According to Escher, a governmentmust punish individ-
uals who wanted to spread new religious doctrines; the reason for doing so
was not theological, because of the religious deviation, but political, because
the lack of uniformity could provoke unrest within the state. According
to Escher, even those citizens who did not manifest their dissenting faith
54. Escher 2008: 588–92, 598.
55. Escher 2008: 618–22; Escher ends with a quotation from Cicero, De officiis, 3, 6, justifying
tyrannicide.
56. Ulric Huber printed hisDe jura civitatis for the first time in 1672, but Escher could have used the
revised edition of 1694. The Aristotelian Huber opposed Hobbes and interpreted the
fundamental laws of the republic as the rights which the citizens preserved from the state of
nature; if the ruler transgressed them, Huber agreed that the citizens had the right of
resistance. Huber 1708: 306 (1, 9, 6, 30).
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openly inpublic couldbe expelled fromthe country.This assertionmetfierce
opposition in the audience. Many listeners were French Huguenots whom
Louis XIV had forced into exile in 1685. They claimed that no ruler was
allowed to limit natural freedom in religious matters. According to them,
Escher’s sixteenth thesis contradicted the spirit of his whole dissertation on
liberty. Escher first tried to defend his argument, but eventually capitulated.
He conceded that he had developed his case from the perspective of a Zurich
citizen, but that now he understood that a good Christian had to opt for
politics of toleration in matters of conscience.57
Escher’s public conversion illustrates three different approaches to tol-
eration and thus to individual liberty in the federal republics around 1700.
As a citizen of Zurich, he first insists on the republican claim for religious
unity to protect an otherwise unstable state: his libertas populi does not focus
on individual rights, but wants to preserve the community as a whole from
absolute monarchical rule. As for the Huguenot exiles, they require the tol-
eration of their proper creed less as a matter of principle than for strategic
reasons, at least if they belong to the faction of Pierre Jurieu: they want to
reacquire the collective freedom to worship their own, infallible religion in
their home country. The position of theDe la Court brothers and of Spinoza
is different. The diversity of religions stems from imperfect human nature
and from the diversity of individual thinking. Hence the state accords free-
domof religion as a natural right to its citizens as long as they donot provoke
unrest; precisely to avoid turmoil, rulers have the right to control (public)
churches and their creeds.
Another anecdote similarly illustrates the differences between the Swiss
and the Dutch interpretation of liberty in the years around 1700. There
was one recurrent matter of dispute in their usually cordial diplomatic
relations. The tolerant Dutch reproached their allies in Zurich and Berne
because they disagreed on how harshly the Swiss treated the Anabaptists.
They were pursued and forced to emigrate without the right to take their
property with them. The Dutch turned the issue into a universal argument
for the freedom of conscience which brought to light quite different
interpretations of republican virtues. As the pacifist Anabaptists refused
military service, the United Provinces allowed them to exempt themselves
from that duty and to pay a particular tax instead. For the Swiss, however,
57. Escher’s Lebensgeschichte, a manuscript at the Zentralbibliothek in Zurich (FAWyss iii 116), is
edited partially by Keller-Escher 1885, i: 106–7, containing the story of his disputation; see also
the controversial thesis 16 in Escher 2008: 598–602.
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citizenship rested on the ability and willingness to do military service in the
militia.58
It may seem somehow ironic that the political ideal was commercial and
peace-oriented in the Netherlands (and especially in Holland), although the
country was constantly involved in wars, while Berne and Zurich fostered
civic and military values although they were able to develop peacefully and
export war through their mercenaries. This opposition can be explained by
historical and structural differences which we will sum up in a conclusion
in order to understand why the transition from liberties to liberty took so
much longer in the Swiss case than in the Dutch.
1 Protecting (Calvinist) believers against apowerful, repressive statewasone
of the causes of Dutch independence, while the Confederates understood
themselves to be a people elected by divine will when they became for few
decades a European power, a position they definitively lostwhen religious
uniformity broke apart in the Reformation. While the freedom to choose
one’s religion was at the origin of the Dutch miracle, it caused the Swiss
decline.
2 However, not even in the Netherlands was there practical or theoretical
continuity in dealing with religious dissent, and until at least the 1630s
a considerable gap remained between the (tacit) freedom of conscience
and the freedom of open practice. More than the ideas of regents and
philosophers, social and economic reality dictated a politics of toleration.
Economic success provoked steady immigration from all over the world
while the poor Swiss cantons turned away even wealthy refugees of their
own creed, such as the Huguenots. The Swiss guilds feared competition
within their corporative economy based on the ideal of cantonal autarchy
through careful management of limited resources. To bar access to guilds,
the ranks of citizenship closed completely in the seventeenth century
for the subjects living in the same canton and even more for foreign-
ers. Religious uniformity hence was also a means to enforce privileged
exclusivity. TheDutch regents weremore pragmatic because they dealt in
international commerce andwere used to differences. As urbanmerchants
with a humanist education, they thought also more positively about indi-
viduality than the Swiss, where agriculture dominated and often imposed
collective solutions and joint work.
3 In Switzerland, religious uniformity corresponded not only to social and
economic life, but also to the almost absolutist grip that the cantons
58. Altorfer-Ong 2008.
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had on their relatively small and barely urbanised territories; there was
little space for divergence. The situation was different in the commercial
towns of Holland and especially in the metropolis of Amsterdam. While
Swiss cantons were ruled by the homogenous elite of just one city, this
was not the case in theDutch provinces, especially in the commercial ones
on the coast, where the different interests of cities of various sizes had to
be co-ordinated. While the United Provinces formed a relatively strong
and centralised state, compared to the Confederation, the Swiss cantons
were strong petty states compared to the (urban) Dutch provinces. That
is why they could impose religious uniformity on their territory but not
in the joint dependencies administered moderately by cantons of both
faiths; similarly, in some alpine areas (Glarus, Appenzell and the allied
Grisons), communal autonomy was so highly developed that the canton
itself became bi-confessional. The stronger the state, the better it could
insist on homogeneity.
4 The Reformed cantons had a state church, and the Catholic cantons con-
trolledtheirchurchtightly, eventhoughtheyformallydependedonRome.
Hence religious unity was easy to impose and corresponded with the
shared needs of churchmen and politicians. The Dutch Calvinist was not
a state church but a public church. Officials had to belong to it, but not
the run-of-the-mill believers. Although the urban regents fought hard bat-
tles against Calvinist orthodoxy to bring the public church under the rule
of the state, they never managed to have a partnership as close as that
which existed within the Swiss cantons. The Dutch orthodox Calvinists
themselveshad serious inhibitions about anall-encompassingchurch.This
wouldhavemeant includingmanyhalf-heartedDutchmen in a church that
should be reserved to the devout.
5 As far as conceptsof libertywere at stake, Swiss statehooddependedon lib-
erties of the empire. At the beginning of their revolt, the Dutch defended
their ancient privileges too. But very soon they had to switch to an inter-
pretation within the framework of international law and sovereignty con-
quered by the force of arms, not only to justify a revolt against a legitimate
ruler and the resulting free state without a monarchical head, but also to
define and limit the powers of the stadtholder. Unlike the exposedDutch,
the Swiss could go on interpreting their Confederation within medieval
imperial law and its system of privileges or liberties granted to collectives
(universitates in the medieval sense).
6 Such collectives always had to be distinguished from others and were
defined through the features themembers shared; in earlymodernEurope,
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the most important one, besides lordship, was religious denomination.
Therefore, the Swiss could hardly conceive of their liberties without a
common belief. In contrast, the concept of sovereignty opposed the –
single or collective – ruler to his subjects not as groups, but as individuals.
Liberty was the appropriate word to describe the rights he (as an absolute
ruler) conceded to them or they (in a free state) could claim against him.
Religion was the early modern touchstone for liberty, because it could be
conceived as the result of individual conscience or collective belonging.
The different pace of toleration debates in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land is highly indicative of the slow transition from medieval liberties
to modern liberty, a process only completed at the time of the French
Revolution.59
59. See Velema 2007: 139–57, for the changing concept of liberty during the decisive years of the
patriotic revolt in the 1780s; for Switzerland during the same time seeWeinmann 2002.
